[Draft; Please do not cite without author 's permission.] Delaware has a population less than one-third of one percent of the nation, but it is the state of incorporation of over 50% of U.S. public companies and over 60% of the Fortune 500.
provides the governing law. But under modern incorporation statutes, a corporate charter is extremely easy to obtain, and there is no requirement of any meaningful contact whatsoever with the chartering state. Thus corporations can, in effect, choose the corporate governance laws that will apply to them, regardless of whether they have any other contact with the state whose laws they choose. This ability of corporations to elect their governance law is illegitimate as a democratic matter and inefficient as an economic matter.
The dominance of Delaware is staggering. Over 300,000 companies are incorporated there, and nearly 300 of the Fortune 500. The state with the secondmost of the Fortune 500, New York, has only 25. In fact. so many companies incorporate in Delaware that incorporation and franchise fees provide one-quarter of total state revenues. So under the internal affairs doctrine, unique in law, to allow corporations to choose the corporate governance law that applies to them, Delaware has reached an exceptional position of power. This position is guarded jealously by the Delaware legislature and judiciary, since it brings them disproportionate influence. (Indeed, the state's Chancery and Supreme Courts are arguably the most important judicial bodies for corporations in the entire world.) Importantly, nobody within the tiny state has any reason to challenge the state's dominance.
The Internal Affairs Doctrine
Delaware's dominance would perhaps not be so striking if by "internal affairs" we meant only the narrow relationship between managers and the company.
But because companies affect so many stakeholders, and because even the most "internal" rule has implications for those stakeholders, it is impossible to claim that internal affairs are immaterial to anyone other than shareholders and managers.
Examples abound. Other stakeholders undoubtedly are affected by a rule that directors should maximize profit to shareholders, or a rule that directors should not disclose information to communities about their business practices absent a legal or financial imperative, or a rule that shareholders need not pay the debts of the corporation.
Indeed, the law of fiduciary obligation itself -arguably the most "internal" of all rules -says that the directors owe duties of care and loyalty to shareholders. In so The key problem is that Delaware law, in the process of establishing the laws governing the internal workings of corporations chartered in the state, reaches beyond its borders to affect all the corporation's stakeholders. This includes those who have no political influence over the terms, requirements, or status of the laws.
Delaware law can therefore be crafted without attention to the political influence of any important stakeholder residing outside the state, unless that influence can be transformed into market terms that the corporation itself will care about. The internal affairs doctrine thus allows Delaware to externalize the costs of its rules on other stakeholders and indeed other states. Corporate law should not promote this odd result. Rather, the conflict rules for corporate governance should be consistent with the conflict rules in other areas of the law: The state that has the greatest interest in regulating the internal affairs of a corporation should provide the rules for corporate governance. If this simple, straightforward, and consistent rule were followed, it would bring about fundamental changes in the way corporate law is provided in the United States. Instead of being an area of law uniquely insulated from democratic pressures, corporate law would become subject to the same political pressures that other areas of the law are subject to.
A Hypothetical Statute
Let's imagine that a particular state legislature in, for example, Massachusetts, believes that corporations consistently undervalue the interests of their employees, especially when corporations consider fundamental decisions such as a merger, an acquisition, or a major sale of assets. In such a context, Massachusetts might consider the following statute.
Regardless of where such a corporation is chartered, the directors of: (a) a corporation that employs 51% or more of its employees within Massachusetts; or (b) a corporation that employs more employees within Massachusetts than in any other state or political subdivision of the United States or other nation; shall consider the interests of the corporation's employees in making decisions that have a material effect on the level of the corporation's present or future employment. Such a duty shall be deemed satisfied if the board of directors includes at least one member who is elected by hourly-wage employees rather than shareholders.
Without a doubt, this statute purports to regulate the internal affairs of certain corporations. The statute also almost certainly conflicts with Delaware law, in that Delaware law by most accounts requires corporate directors to owe an "unyielding" duty to the corporation and its stockholders.
14 This legal duty is interpreted to bar the consideration of employee interests except insofar as is necessary to further shareholder interests. 15 The hypothetical Massachusetts statute also conflicts with the Delaware requirement that directors be elected by shareholders.
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Let us now imagine a case arising under this statute. A Massachusetts employee of a corporation sues in Massachusetts court to enjoin a planned merger of that corporation with another. The employee shows that the majority of the corporation's employees reside in Massachusetts and that the corporation's directors have refused to consider the interests of the employees in the merger negotiations.
The corporation files a motion to dismiss, saying that it is chartered in Delaware and that Delaware law governs its internal affairs.
Should the suit be dismissed? At first look, the answer seems to be an easy "yes." The statute purports to regulate the internal affairs of corporations incorporated in Delaware, and if the internal affairs doctrine controls, then the statutes would not be valid when applied to such corporations. The corporations will argue that the statutes should not be applied to them and that the cases should be dismissed. The internal affairs doctrine is so embedded that this hypothetical statute would likely not be passed by a state legislature in the first place. Few would think of such regulation as a real possibility. Nevertheless, there is an economic argument for this kind of statute and a democratic argument for this kind of statute, and these arguments are remarkably similar.
The Economic Argument for the Hypothetical Statute
The economic argument is straightforward. It focuses on externalities, which are routinely cited as a cause of inefficient decisions and thus a rationale for government regulation. Indeed, the internal affairs doctrine is easily characterized, to This argument against the internal affairs doctrine assumes that the socially optimal level of public regulation is not zero. States, localities, and the federal government are charged with regulating the public and private spheres in order to maximize social welfare (broadly defined). Governments care, and should, about crafting the proper mix of regulation to reach certain social goals in the most efficient way. Even if one cares only about economic wellbeing, governments must routinely step in to the market to adjust for market defects such as monopolies, insufficient information, obstacles to negotiation, and (yes) externalities. Over time and if guided conscientiously and honestly, governments find out which policy tools are more efficient than others in reaching public policy objectives. One way that governments learn is through feedback from the citizenry. It is almost needless to say that this result diverges from that which is socially optimal. By any reasonable assumption, a socially optimal law of corporate governance would take into account the interests of parties other than shareholders and managers. The internal affairs doctrine all but makes this impossible and thus guarantees that the corporate law actually provided will fall short of optimality.
Nor is the optimal result reached even if one assumes, as do many corporate scholars, that the concerns of non-shareholder constituencies should be left to bodies of law other than corporate law (such as labor and employment law, environmental law, or consumer protection law). A state seeking to create a sociallyoptimal system of regulation for corporations doing business within its jurisdiction but not chartered there will have fewer regulatory options at its disposal. As long as the internal affairs doctrine applies, changes in corporate governance will be unavailable. Fewer regulatory options will usually result in less efficient and more costly regulation, and will move the end result away from social optimality.
This argument is further illustrated if one were to analogize the "internal affairs" doctrine to another area of law -for example, environmental law. Imagine that Delaware allowed companies to come to it and, for a fee, receive permits to increase sulfur dioxide emissions, to log in old-growth forests, or to construct
shopping malls in open spaces. What's more, these permits would have legal force regardless of where these activities occurred. Such a regime would be disastrous.
No one would suggest that Delaware was engaging in a "race to the top" in environmental protection. Nor would anyone suggest that the end result was the most efficient because states could compete on the basis of what permits to offer. There are many reasons why this story does not work. The story assumes that the negotiation among the various stakeholders is efficient, informed, and inexpensive to perform. (Coase himself recognized that his theory works only in the absence of transaction costs.) But in reality, the barriers to engaging in the kind of real negotiation necessary for an efficient outcome are immense. As discussed in chapter three, the labor market is much less efficient than the securities market. This means that it is much more difficult for workers to translate their concerns into market terms. Moreover, it is much less likely that workers will be able even to discover the implications for them of various corporate governance regimes. In other words, the barriers to information about the implications of corporate law are greater for workers (who do not have many institutions who help them in such matters) than for shareholders (who do). page 12 Finally, the internal affairs doctrine gives the shareholders and managers a huge advantage in any real or hypothetical negotiation. They begin with the "right"
to decide where to incorporate, and they give it up only if they are compensated in some way. Because of the internal affairs doctrine, states must pay attention to the interests of shareholders and managers and need pay attention to the interests of others only if they learn that shareholders are better off if they do. In such a situation, the shareholders hold the initial right to have the state pay attention to them; everyone else has to "pay" to have the state pay attention to them. This default position is very "sticky," in that it is difficult to move away from it.
Numerous studies show that even inefficient starting points in a negotiation have a great bit of staying power.
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All this is to say that there is absolutely no reason to believe that the framework of corporate governance in the United States has reached an efficient outcome for stakeholders other than shareholders and managers. Even if we have experienced a "race to the top" for the corporate elite, other stakeholders are disadvantaged severely because of the internal affairs doctrine. States are bullied into catering to the interests of firms' decision makers. If any state wants to take account of other stakeholders in their corporate law in any serious way -that is, in any way that actually hurts shareholders and managers -the state is dooming itself to an exodus of firm incorporations. This virtually guarantees that the state will decline to use corporate law as a policy tool to the extent it should be so used, leaving the state to less efficient regulatory options.
The Democratic Argument for The Hypothetical Statute
The argument from democracy is strikingly similar to the economic argument. The difference is that in addition to being inconsistent with social welfare, the internal affairs doctrine is inconsistent with democratic legitimacy. The internal affairs doctrine allows Delaware to insulate its laws from democratic pressures by allowing corporations to take advantage of Delaware's laws of corporate governance without subjecting themselves to the other laws of the state. Corporations located outside of Delaware can adopt Delaware's laws for their internal affairs, leaving other non-shareholder stakeholders affected by those laws but with no democratic mechanism to influence those laws. page 13 This is not true with regard to any other area of law. It is possible, of course, for two or more states to have conflicting laws on a specific subject, or to have the laws of one state affect the citizens of another. (For example, the tort law of a given state will affect the citizens of other states whenever they travel within the given state.) But typical conflict of laws notions help resolve these disputes, and these notions --which balance the interests of states in regulating given behavior --embody important democratic principles. When state laws are in conflict, one reason why the governing law comes from the state with the greatest interest in regulating the behavior is that such law typically has a better democratic pedigree. A state may have an interest in regulating because it is the site of the behavior at issue, or because most of the people regulated are residents there. But the state that has the greatest interest in a specific dispute will, almost by definition, be subject to democratic pressures with regard to the law at issue.
Indeed, there is a value in recognizing the interest of the particular state in which the political accountability for the law in question is maximized. If the legislature or courts "get it wrong" in making regulatory decisions, it is easier to correct the mistake when the state has within its borders those whose behavior is regulated or who those who bear the costs or gain the benefits of the regulation.
More to the point, one would not expect a state whose interest in regulating the behavior at issue derives only from the desire to gain incorporation fees to have the appropriate democratic incentives to correct missteps within the regulatory framework.
There is an even more fundamental point. At some level, politics is about constructing a community. The rules of the community should, according to democratic theory, be put in place either by the community itself or by representatives of the community who are subject to community oversight. Those who live in such a community are deemed to have voluntarily subjected themselves to the laws of such a community. One can have a say in the laws of the community as long as one consents to be governed by those laws. The laws of one community
should not be thrust on another without the consent of the other. Nor is it a response to the democratic legitimacy critique to say that other stakeholders still have market power. Democracy is not the market, nor vice versa.
The market is available as a recourse whether the internal affairs doctrine is in place or not. Often, the best way to protect one's interests is not through the market but through the political process. Yet the internal affairs doctrine places the governance of corporations off limits to the political process, except to the political process of The power of the internal affairs doctrine is so strong that few states challenge it. But more should. The doctrine is not required by federal law or by any aspect of constitutional law. 24 It is not required, or could it be, by the restatement.
In fact, as mentioned above, the restatement assumes that the interests of a given had a significant interest in regulating the behavior at issue. A state may not always be able to convince a judge that its interests are the most significant and that its law should apply. But if usual conflicts of laws rules were to apply, such a state would win sometimes. That would be more often than such a state wins now, which is never. In relaxing the constraints of the internal affairs doctrine, corporate law would become more accountable to the states in which the corporations themselves are enjoying the benefit of the social and legal fabric. That would be a good thing.
